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Not Just "Every Man": Revisiting the Journalist's Privilege
Against Compelled Disclosure of Confidential Sources
JAIME M. PORTER*
"A popular government without popular information, or the means of
acquiring it, is but a prologue to a farce or tragedy; or perhaps both."'
INTRODUCTION
In its pursuit of truth and justice, the American judicial system has long relied on
the principle that the public "has a right to every man's evidence."2 To this end, courts
rely on a strong presumption against recognizing evidentiary privileges. This
presumption, however, is not absolute; rather, throughout the years, the law has
recognized that disclosures made within the confines of certain relationships should be
privileged. While evidentiary privileges have been recognized since as early as the
second century, A.D.,3 and well-established privileges exist for attorney-client,4
psychotherapist-patient, clergy-penitent, 6 and spousal communications,' a modem
movement is underway to provide an evidentiary privilege for yet another set of
communications: those between journalists and their sources.
* J.D. Candidate, Indiana University School of Law-Bloomington, 2007; B.A.,
University of Michigan, 2002. I would like to thank my parents, Jim and Gail Porter, for their
support and encouragement, and for the many hours spent reading and critiquing my writing
over the years. A special thank you is owed to my grandfather, Hon. James M. Porter, for
inspiring me to become a lawyer.
1. Letter from James Madison to W.T. Barry (Aug. 4, 1822), in THE FOUNDERS'
CoNsTrruToN 690 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987).
2. United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 331 (1950) (quoting 7 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE
§ 2192 (McNaughton rev. 1961)).
3. Marshall Williams, The Scope of the Corporate Attorney-Client Privilege in View of
Reason and Experience, 25 How. L.J. 425, 426 (1982). "The Roman law of slavery in effect
gave rise to the predecessor of the attorney-client privilege." Id.
4. "The attorney-client privilege is the oldest of the privileges for confidential
communications known to the common law." Upjohn Co. v. U.S., 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981)
(citing 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2290 (McNaughton rev. 1961)).
5. See discussion of Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1 (1996), infra Part III.A.
6. The clergy-penitent privilege is considered one of the three professional privileges
recognized in federal courts (the other two being the psychotherapist-patient and attorney-client
privileges). GEORGE FISHER, EVIDENCE 756 (2002). For a discussion of the clergy-penitent
privilege, see, e.g., In re Grand Jury Investigation, 918 F.2d 374 (3d. Cir. 1990); Morales v.
Portuondo, 154 F. Supp.2d 706 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
7. See, e.g., United States v. Rakes, 136 F.3d 1, 3 (1 st Cir. 1998) (stating that the marital
communications privilege "permits an individual to refuse to testify, and to prevent a spouse or
former spouse from testifying, as to any confidential communication made by the individual to
the spouse during their marriage").
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It is undisputed that journalists must sometimes rely on confidential sources, 8 and it
is also clear that the press, as an institution, serves a vital function in our democratic
system.9 In order to keep the public informed, the press must be unimpeded in
gathering information; yet, the legal protection afforded to the press for maintaining the
confidentiality of its sources remains nebulous. The Supreme Court addressed
confidential sources in Branzburg v. Hayes, holding that compelling journalists to
disclose the identities of such sources before grand juries does not abridge the
freedoms of speech and press guaranteed by the First Amendment.'0 Despite the
Supreme Court's ruling, many federal courts have nonetheless recognized a privilege
against disclosure of sources in the grand jury setting." Many states have also
counteracted the Supreme Court's Branzburg ruling by passing shield laws to protect
journalists.
The privilege established by federal courts and state legislatures, however, is
inconsistent at best. In addition, there is an emerging trend towards narrowing the
privilege.' 2 The journalist's privilege gained particular notoriety from the highly
publicized incarceration of former New York Times reporter Judith Miller for her
refusal to comply with a court order compelling disclosure of the source who revealed
covert CIA agent Valerie Plame's identity.' 3 While this case incited national debate
8. Walter Cronkite has stated that "in doing my work, I . . . depend constantly on
information, ideas, leads and opinions received in confidence. Such material is essential in
digging out newsworthy facts and, equally important, in assessing the importance and analyzing
the significance of public events." Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 730 n.8 (1972). Journalist
James Taricani, who was held in contempt for not revealing sources, has also expressed the
necessity of confidentiality: "I wish all my sources could be on the record, but when people are
afraid, a promise of confidentiality may be the only way to get the information to the public, and
in some cases, to protect the well-being of the source." Pam Belluck, Reporter is Found Guilty
for Refusal to Name Source, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19, 2004, at A24.
9. Chief Justice Burger called journalists "surrogates for the public," referring to the
necessity of the media for disseminating information about trials to the public. Richmond
Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 572-73 (1980).
10. 408 U.S. 665, 667.
11. When finding that a privilege exists, many courts have relied on Justice Powell's
Branzburg concurrence. See infra Part I.B.
12. The United States fell more than twenty places in the Reporters Without Borders 2005
World Press Freedom Index. The organization attributed this occurrence to "the imprisonment
of New York Times reporter Judith Miller and judicial action that is undermining the privacy of
journalistic sources," particularly the increased boldness of federal courts in subpoenaing
reporters to disclose confidential sources. Reporters Without Borders, The 2005 World Press
Freedom Index, Oct. 20,2005, at 2, available at www.rsf.org/IMG/pdf/CM_2005_AmEng.pdf
(last visited Feb. 26, 2007).
13. The Miller controversy began in 2003, when journalist Robert Novak published the
name of covert CIA agent Valerie Plame Wilson. See, e.g., Nicholas Lemann, Telling Secrets:
How a Leak Became a Scandal, THE NEW YORKER, Nov. 7, 2005. A special prosecutor, Patrick
Fitzgerald, was appointed to investigate the potential violation of The Intelligence Identities
Protection Act of 1982, 50 U.S.C. § 421 (1982), which criminalizes revealing the identity of a
CIA agent. Id. While Miller investigated the Plame story, she never published an article about it.
Id. Nevertheless, she was subpoenaed by Fitzgerald to testify in front of a grand jury
investigating the leak. When Miller refused to cooperate, she was held in contempt of court by
the D.C. District Court; the Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the decision, and the Supreme
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over the legal soundness of the privilege, the subpoenaing ofjournalists to testify about
their confidential sources is not anomalous in the realm ofjournalism. Media lawyers
report that there has been a recent increase in the number of subpoenas being issued to
journalists, and that "the legal climate for those seeking to protect confidential sources
is turning chillier., 1 4 In addition to a spate of cases in the D.C. Circuit (the Miller and
related Matthew Cooper cases,15 as well as the Wen Ho Lee case 6), a number of other
federal courts, including the First, Fifth, and Seventh Circuits, have recently denied
Court denied certiorari. See In re Special Counsel Investigation, 332 F. Supp.2d 26 (D.D.C.
2004); In re Grand Jury Subpoena, Judith Miller, 397 F.3d 964 (D.C. Cir. 2005), cert. denied,
545 U.S. 1150 (2005). In sum, Miller was denied protection against revealing her sources; she
ultimately served eighty-five days in a federal prison for refusing to do so. See, e.g., Jeffrey
Toobin, Name that Source, THE NEW YORKER, Jan. 16, 2006, at 30. The irony of the Miller story
is that Fitzgerald knew the leaker's identity (it was Richard Armitage, a former deputy secretary
of state under Colin Powell) from "his very first day in the special counsel's chair." David
Johnston, Leak Revelation Leaves Questions, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 2, 2006, at Al.
14. Katherine Q. Seeyle, Journalists Say Threat of Subpoena Intensifies, N.Y. TIMES, July
4, 2005, at Cl. Because there is no database to track how many subpoenas have been issued to
reporters, it is difficult to quantify the increase, and some prosecutors dispute that there has been
an increase at all. Id. However, according to the Newspaper Association of America, more than
two dozen reporters nationwide were subpoenaed or questioned about their confidential sources
in 2004-2005. Id. The Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press has estimated that
"subpoenas and other quests for journalists' sources of information now approach two thousand
per year." Robert Zelnick, Journalists and Confidential Sources, 19 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHIcs &
PUB. POL'Y 541, 549 (2005).
15. Time reporter Matthew Cooper also faced legal action for his initial refusal to provide
grand jury testimony regarding his sources for the Plame leak. At the last moment, Cooper
agreed to testify after being released from confidentiality by his source. Yet just days prior to
this, Cooper's bosses at Time turned over his notes and revealed the identity of his source. See,
e.g., David Kidwell, Commentary, Free Press Code Often Requires Some Sacrifice, MIAMI
HERALD, July 10, 2005, at L5.
16. Lee v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 327 F. Supp.2d 26 (D.D.C. 2004). Wen Ho Lee was a
scientist at Los Alamos accused of stealing classified nuclear data. After Lee was implicated in a
Washington Post article that relied on unidentified sources, Walter Pincus, U.S. Cracking Down
on Chinese Designs on Nuclear Data, WASH. POST, Feb. 17, 1999 at A7, he filed a lawsuit
against the federal government, arguing that his rights under the federal Privacy Act had been
violated. Toobin, supra note 13. To prove his case, Lee had to "establish that government
officials improperly disclosed information." Id. at 33. However, after failing to get any
information from deposed government employees, Lee and his attorneys began issuing
subpoenas to journalists. Id. at 34. The D.C. Circuit Court ordered the journalists to testify, and
its decision was upheld by the court of appeals. See Lee v. Dept. of Justice, 327 F. Supp.2d 26
(2004), affid 413 F.3d 53, 55 (2005). The case settled in 2006, with the government dropping
the case, and the media organizations subpoenaed paying $750,000 in order to retain the
confidentiality of their sources. Paul Farhi, U.S., Media Settle With Wen Ho Lee, WASH. POST,
June 3, 2006, at AI. Henry Hoberman, senior vice president of ABC, summed up the media's
settlement agreement:
Unfortunately, the journalists in this case ... reluctantly concluded that the only
way they could continue to protect the bond with their sources and sidestep
increasing punishment, including possible jail time, was to contribute to the
settlement with the government and Wen Ho Lee... It was not a decision that any
of the journalists came to easily or happily.
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journalists protection from disclosing sources.17 These developments indicate that the
protections that have served journalists for the past thirty years-from the First
Amendment and state statutes, to the common law, and Department of Justice
guidelines' s-may no longer be adequate.' 9 The tension between investigative
journalists, whose objective is to keep the public informed, and prosecutors in search
of indictments and justice, is no longer in balance, and thus it is necessary to revisit the
journalist's privilege.20
This Note contemplates two means for strengthening the journalist's privilege,
beyond a revisiting of Branzburg by the Supreme Court: finding a common law
evidentiary privilege through Federal Rule of Evidence 501 ("Rule 50 1") and passage
of a federal shield law by Congress. Part I of this Note discusses the seminal holding in
Branzburg, while Part II details post-Branzburg jurisprudence and the resulting need
for a stronger privilege. Part III then discusses ways of strengthening the privilege and
the institutional actors who would be required to do so.
Finally, Part IV looks at the values implicated in each solution and concludes that
while finding the privilege via Rule 501 is most practical, particularly in light of the
Supreme Court's ruling in Jaffee v. Redmond,2' doing so would not adequately protect
the First Amendment values at stake. Rather, the best response to the need for a
stronger privilege is action by Congress, as only Congress has the ability to ensure that
three key interests are provided for: protecting the democratic values inherent in the
First Amendment; appropriately balancing the journalist's privilege against the
17. E.g., In re Special Proceedings, 373 F.3d 37,45 (1stCir. 2004) (upholding a contempt
order against investigative reporter Jim Taricani on the basis that the special prosecutor's
request for confidential information was "highly relevant" and reasonable efforts were made to
obtain the information elsewhere); McKevitt v. Pallasch, 339 F.3d 530 (7th Cir. 2003)
(upholding the district court's order compelling production of tape recordings of journalists'
nonconfidential interviews on the basis that subpoena was reasonable under the circumstances
and no First Amendment interest was at stake); see also Daniel Scardino, Vanessa Leggett
Serves Maximum Jail Time, First Amendment-Based Reporter's Privilege Under Siege, 19
COMM. LAW 4, 11 (discussing the Fifth Circuit's determination that "the Constitution does not
offer any testimonial or material privilege for reporters in the context of a grand jury or even a
criminal proceeding"); infra note 83 (discussing the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth
Circuits' stances on the journalist's privilege).
18. See 28 C.F.R. § 50.10 (2005).
19. But see Benjamin Wittes, Leaks and the Law, THE ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Dec. 2004, at
116. Wittes argues that the threat of prosecutors subpoenaing reporters for disclosure of
confidential sources is minimal. A prosecutor who calls a reporter before a grand jury "knows
he's going to have to litigate. He also knows that even if he wins, the reporter will most likely
go to jail rather than give up a source; and even if a judge is willing to hold a reporter in
contempt, it is rare for a court to use its coercive powers in anything more than token form." Id.
at 117. Thus, there is only a slim likelihood of a prosecutor actually obtaining the information
sought.
20. For up-to-date synopses regarding "the federal shield law effort and... other legal
controversies involving reporters' subpoenas," see The Reporters Committee for Freedom of the
Press, Special Report: Reporters and Federal Subpoenas, http://www.rcfp.org/shields-and_
subpoenas.html (last visited Feb. 26, 2007).
21. 518 U.S. 1 (1996).
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administration ofjustice; and safeguarding the free speech of both journalists and their
sources.
I. THE IMPETUS FOR A CONSTITUTIONALLY-BASED JOURNALIST'S PRIVILEGE: THE
RISE IN INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALISM AND THE BRANZBURG DECISION
A. The Majority Holding: No Constitutional Privilege
While lower courts first addressed the idea of the journalist's privilege in 1958,22
the Supreme Court did not take up the issue until 1972, in Branzburg v. Hayes.23
During the tumultuous years leading up to this decision, investigative reporting took on
increased importance. As the revolutionary tenor of the era's social and political
movements resonated throughout American society, journalists often had to grant
confidentiality in order to obtain information on "highly charged topics" that would
otherwise be unavailable to the public.24 At the same time, federal and state
prosecutors began using their subpoena power to "gain access to confidential
information obtained [by journalists] in the process of gathering news about highly
controversial topics."
25
Branzburg was a consolidation of district court cases involving three reporters who
were subpoenaed by grand juries to testify about confidential sources.26 The Branzburg
case illuminated the tension between a grand jury's interest in obtaining information
related to criminal conduct and a journalist's interest in protecting confidential
sources,27 with the reporters asserting that the First Amendment protected their right
against disclosure. Specifically, the reporters argued that in order to gather news, it was
necessary for them to "agree either not to identify the source of information published
or to publish only part of the facts revealed, or both. 28 Without the ability to protect
22. Garland v. Torre, 259 F.2d 545 (2d Cir. 1958) (Stewart, J.). Although the Garland court
did not grant an evidentiary privilege to the newsperson at issue, Judge Stewart (who went on to
write a dissent in Branzburg) did allude to the possibility of a privilege in some instances, such
as the forcing of a "wholesale disclosure of a newspaper's confidential sources of news" or cases
in which the "identity of the news source is of doubtful relevance or materiality." Id. at 549-50.
23. 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
24. See Heather Stamp, Case Notes and Comments, McKevitt v. Pallasch: How the Ghosts
of the Branzburg Decision are Haunting Journalists in the Seventh Circuit, 14 DEPAuL-LCA J.
ART & ENT. L. & POL'Y 363, 370 (2004).
25. Note, Reporters and Their Sources: The Constitutional Right to a Confidential
Relationship, 80 YALE L.J. 317, 317 (1970). For a synopsis of subpoenas issued on "highly
controversial topics" of the era, see id. at 317 n. 1.
26. Paul Branzburg, a reporter in Kentucky, was asked to testify regarding an article he had
published on the making of marijuana and drug use in Frankfort, Kentucky. Branzburg, 408
U.S. at 667-71. Paul Pappas, a reporter in New England, was subpoenaed regarding his
reporting at the Black Panthers' headquarters (though he never published a story). Id. at 672-75.
Earl Caldwell, a New York Times reporter, was also subpoenaed regarding his investigation of
the Black Panthers, and he was specifically asked to hand over "notes and tape recordings of
interviews given him for publication by officers and spokesmen of the Black Panther Party." Id.
at 675-77.
27. Id. at 681-82.
28. Id. at 679-80.
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confidential source identities, the reporters feared that future sources would be deterred
from providing information, thus burdening newsgathering activities. 29 Ultimately,
such a burden would impede the free flow of information to the public, particularly on
controversial or sensitive issues that potential sources might be hesitant to discuss with
reporters. 
30
In holding that the First Amendment does not protect journalists from identifying
confidential sources before a grand jury, the Branzburg majority relied on a number of
rationales. 31 While recognizing the importance of the First Amendment's protection of
free speech and a free press, the majority focused instead on the government's interest
in investigating and prosecuting crime.32 The government's pursuit of these goals
obligates all citizens, when called upon, to provide evidence to grand juries, and the
Court found no reason to exempt journalists from this requirement.33 The majority
pointed out that incidental burdens on the First Amendment are not always invalid;
rather, burdens resulting from the "general applicability" of criminal or civil statutes
may be acceptable. 34 The majority also noted that the press has never been wholly
impervious to restrictions on its activity.
35
Balanced against the First Amendment interests of the press was the role of grand
juries in the criminal justice system. 36 Grand juries are constitutionally required, 37 and,
because they are required to return only well-founded indictments, their "investigative
powers are necessarily broad. 38 In light of the important role of grand juries in
pursuing justice, the maxim that the "public has a right to every man's evidence" rang
especially true to the Branzburg majority,39 which determined that the government's
interest in "fair and effective law enforcement" outweighed the benefits of providing an
evidentiary privilege to journalists. 40
29. Id. at 681-82.
30. Id. at 680.
31. Id. at 682-85.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 682, 685.
34. Id. at 682. The Court stated that "[o]therwise valid laws serving substantial public
interests may be enforced against the press as against others, despite the possible [First
Amendment] burden that may be imposed." Id. at 682-83.
35. See id. at 683-86. The majority details Supreme Court jurisprudence related to the
press, noting first that the press has "[n]o special immunity from the application of general
laws." Id. at 683 (quoting Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103, 132-33 (1937)). Among
other restrictions, newspapers are "not free to publish with impunity everything and anything
[they] desire[]," id.; journalists and newspapers can be punished for contempt of court, id at
684; and the press does not have "a constitutional right of special access to information not
available to the public generally." Id.
36. The Branzburg majority described the grand jury as having two functions: (1)
"determining if there is probable cause to believe that a crime has been committed"; and (2)
"protecting citizens against unfounded criminal prosecutions." Id. at 685.
37. The Fifth Amendment states that "[no] person shall be held to answer for a capital, or
otherwise infamous crime, unless on presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury." U.S. CONST.
amend. V.
38. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 688.
39. Id. at 689 (citing United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 331 (1950)).
40. Id. at 690.
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In refuting the reporters' arguments, the majority considered the extent of the
burden imposed on the press by a denial of the privilege against disclosure of
confidential sources.4 1 One of the strongest arguments against granting a privilege was
the lack of empirical evidence supporting the reporters' deterrence argument.42 The
majority also expressed concern that in the grand jury setting, those reporters most
worried about compelled disclosure were likely either personally involved in the
criminal conduct at issue or else protecting sources involved in such conduct.43 The
majority believed that in these scenarios, requests by sources to remain anonymous
were "a product of [the] desire to escape criminal prosecution."" In the eyes of the
Court, allowing such a result---even in the name of First Amendment freedoms and the
importance of newsgathering--could not be justified.45
Finally, the majority expressed concern over the role of the judiciary in enforcing a
journalist's privilege, specifically with regard to the "practical and conceptual
difficulties" that creating a journalist's privilege would entail.46 Creating a privilege
would require courts to define who qualifies as a journalist 47 and to make factual and
legal determinations regarding whether it was appropriate for the journalist to have
been called to testify. 48 The majority also felt that courts should not be "inextricably
involved" in "considering whether enforcement of a particular law serve[s] a
'compelling' governmental interest. ' 49 Making such case-by-case determinations about
the appropriateness of testimony by journalists would "require [the courts to make] a
value judgment that a legislature had declined to make" and would clearly overstep the
41. Id. at 691.
42. Id. Specifically, the majority was unclear about the frequency and extent to which
informants were actually deterred. Id. at 693. The majority also determined there was
insufficient evidence to support a conclusion that compelled disclosure would ultimately
constrict the flow of news to the public. Id.
43. Id. at 691.
44. Id. The majority further underscored this point, stating that "[t]he [First] Amendment
does not reach so far as to override the interest of the public in ensuring that neither reporter nor
source is invading the rights of other citizens through reprehensible conduct forbidden to all
other persons." Id. at 691-92.
45. Id. at 691.
46. Id. at 703-04.
47. Making determinations as to which "organs of communication" could and could not
invoke the privilege would effectively require the courts to discriminate on the basis of content.
Id. at 705 n.40. Favoring one kind of speaker, content, or medium of communication would
potentially violate the First Amendment's principle of neutrality. Linda L. Berger, Shielding the
Unmedia: Using the Process of Journalism to Protect the Journalist's Privilege in an Infinite
Universe of Publication, 39 Hous. L. REv. 1371, 1409 (2003). The majority was prescient with
regard to definitional problems, as the rise of Internet journalism and blogging have
compounded the difficulties in determining who qualifies as ajournalist in modern terms. See,
e.g., Clay Calvert, And You Call Yourself a Journalist?: Wrestling with a Definition of
"Journalist" in the Law, 103 DICK. L. REv. 411 (1999). For example, Professor Calvert asks
whether Matt Drudge, the online publisher who broke the Bill Clinton-Monica Lewinsky sex
scandal, is "a journalist or merely a gossip monger?" Id. at 411; infra note 137 and
accompanying text.
48. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 704.
49. Id. at 705.
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judicial role.50 However, the majority determined that one instance existed in which
journalists could not be compelled to testify: grand juries instituted or conducted "other
than in good faith."5' "Official harassment of the press ... to disrupt a reporter's
relationship with his news sources" would not be tolerated; such activity would be
restrained through judicial control (when dealing with harassment) and subpoenas to
motions to quash (when resisting being compelled to testify).52
Ultimately, the Court held that the reporters at issue in Branzburg were called
before the grand jury "because it was likely that they could supply information to help
the government determine whether illegal conduct had occurred and, if it had, whether
there was sufficient evidence to return an indictment. 53 In essence, the Court found
that the public's interest in law enforcement, plus the vital role of grand juries in
prosecuting crime, 54 combined to outweigh the interests of the press in maintaining
confidentiality.
B. Justice Powell's Balancing Test
Justice Powell was the key fifth vote for Branzburg's majority holding. However, he
issued a strongly-worded concurrence that is nothing short of a fundamental departure
from the majority's holding that no privilege exists. The essence of his concurrence is
that the privilege claim should-be determined on a case-by-case basis and "judged on
its facts by the striking of a proper balance between freedom of the press and the
obligation of all citizens to give relevant testimony with respect to criminal conduct.,
55
Under Justice Powell's view, journalists, when subpoenaed, would be required to
appear before the grand jury, at which time they could assert the privilege of
confidentiality by filing a motion to quash.5 6 Justice Powell's concurrence thus
represents a middle ground between the majority and dissenting opinions. While he
rejected requiring the government to make a threshold showing for the subpoenaing of
journalists,5 7 he did recognize that a First Amendment privilege of confidentiality
exists,58 but in a qualified manner, to be determined by the courts case-by-case. The
significance of this stance became increasingly apparent in the years that followed.59
50. Id. at 706.
51. Id. at 707-08.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 701.
54. "The investigative power of the grand jury is necessarily broad if its public
responsibility is to be adequately discharged." Id. at 700 (citing Costello v. United States, 350
U.S. 359, 364 (1956)).
55. Id. at 710.
56. Id.
57. Id. at n.*. The dissent, however, would have required a threshold showing by the
government upon a journalist's filing of a motion to quash a subpoena. See infra Part I.C and
text accompanying notes 67-69.
58. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 710. "In short, the courts will be available to newsmen under
circumstances where legitimate First Amendment interests require protection." Id.
59. See infra Part II.A.
[Vol. 82:549
REVISITING THE JOURNALISTS' PRIVILEGE
C The Dissent
Justice Stewart's dissent is an important part of the Branzburg puzzle, as it provided
a framework for later arguments regarding a j ournalist's privilege. 60 Joined by Justices
Brennan and Marshall, Justice Stewart focused on the importance of the press to
American democracy 6' in arguing that the First Amendment interest of the press
outweighs the countervailing interest in making the evidence of "every man" available
to grand juries.62
One of the major points of departure between the majority and dissent is over the
deterrent effect of subpoenaing reporters. While the lack of empirical evidence
supporting the deterrence theory proved fatal under the majority's reasoning, the
dissent approached the issue from a more conceptual perspective, concluding that
available evidence and common sense suggested a deterrent effect significant enough
to cause concern.63 The dissent's analysis of the deterrence argument looks first at the
role of the First Amendment in protecting "indispensable liberties, '"64 and notes that
First Amendment rights have never required empirical evidence to "demonstrate[]
beyond any conceivable doubt that deterrent effects exist.
65
Second, the dissent considers the actual manner in which sources would be deterred,
with a particular focus on the types of sources at greatest risk. While not every
confidential relationship will necessarily be deterred, the dissent noted that deterrence
will "certainly occur in certain types of relationships involving sensitive and
controversial matters."' 6 Further, these are the very sources that necessitate protection
if the public is to benefit from the free flow of information that is vital to the healthy
functioning of our democracy. 67 In addition to deterring sources from coming forward,
the dissent noted that a lack of protection against subpoenas could also deterjournalists
from "gathering, analyzing, and publishing the news."" The majority failed to consider
this point, despite the likelihood that reluctance by journalists to fully investigate
sensitive issues would have a detrimental effect on the content of news.
The tangible effects of subpoenas on the newsgathering process and the importance
to democracy of preserving First Amendment values combine to present a formidable
argument in favor of providing a privilege for journalists. Yet before reaching this
60. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 725-52 (Stewart, J., dissenting). Justice Douglas dissented
separately, arguing that reporters have an absolute First Amendment right against appearing in
front of a grand jury or being compelled to testify, unless the reporter himself is implicated in
the crime. Id. at 711-25 (Douglas, J., dissenting). However, the discourse surrounding the
reporter's privilege focuses predominantly on whether there should be a qualified privilege (as
Justice Stewart advocated) or no privilege at all (as the majority advocated).
61. The underlying rationale for protecting a free press is the "broad societal interest in a
full and free flow of information to the public." Id. at 725 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
62. Id. at 738.
63. Id. at 735.
64. Id. at 734 (quoting NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 461 (1958)).
65. Id. at 733.
66. Id. at 735-36.
67. In fact, the importance of the free flow of information to the public has "buttressed [the]
Court's historic presumption in favor of First Amendment values." Id. at 736 n.19.
68. Id. at 730.
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conclusion, the dissent also considered the countervailing interest in the use of grand
juries to administer justice.69 While allowing grand juries to have broad powers and
access to "every man's relevant evidence" is important, this interest is at times limited
by the interests of other Amendments and, when sufficient policy rationales exist, by
common law privileges of evidence. 70 In the case ofjournalists, the First Amendment
interest at stake is not that of private individuals (i.e., the journalist invoking the
privilege); rather, at stake is the public's interest in accessing information that will
enable citizens to contribute to "democratic decisionmaking through the free flow of
information."
71
The dissent recognized that "First Amendment rights require special safeguards, 72
and that the proper constitutional standard of review is strict scrutiny.73 Thus, the
dissent proposed a narrow, three-part test that the government could invoke to
overcome the journalist's privilege: (1) there must be "probable cause to believe that
the newsman has information that is clearly relevant to a specific probable violation of
law"; (2) there must be evidence that "the information sought cannot be obtained by
alternative means less destructive of First Amendment rights"; and (3) there must be a
"compelling and overriding interest in the information." 74
An important aspect of the proposed test is that it provides a qualified privilege that
does not ignore the government interests at stake in grand jury proceedings. Further,
Justice Stewart noted that a journalist would be unable to completely ignore a
subpoena; rather, the journalist would need to move to quash the subpoena, thus
triggering the government's burden of showing that the privilege of confidentiality
should be overridden. 75 At the same time, the test set a threshold high enough to ensure
that journalists would not be subjected to overly vague or broad grand jury
investigations that could have a chilling effect on speech.76
69. Id. at 736-37.
70. Id. at 737.
71. Id. at 738.
72. Id. Supreme Court jurisprudence has long recognized that First Amendment rights are
of vital importance and should receive special consideration when balanced against other
interests. When balanced against the administration of justice, the Court has said, "[i]t is
particularly important that the exercise of the power of compulsory process be carefully
circumscribed when the investigative process tends to impinge upon such highly sensitive areas
as freedom of speech or press... and freedom of communication of ideas." Id. at 739 (quoting
Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 245 (1957) (plurality opinion)).
73. See id. at 739-40. "[Wlhen an investigation impinges on First Amendment rights, the
government must not only show that the inquiry is of 'compelling and overriding importance'
but it must also 'convincingly' demonstrate that the investigation is 'substantially related' to the
information sought." Id.
74. Id. at 743.
75. Id.
76. Vague laws lead to uncertainty about what speech is and is not protected, and thus
"needlessly discourage First Amendment activity." Id. at 741. Reporters who are unsure whether
the law will allow them to protect their sources and sources who are unsure whether the law will
allow them to remain anonymous are both likely to modify their behavior as a result of this
uncertainty. Vagueness is also a concern because of the broad powers of grand juries, which
"are not limited in scope to specific criminal acts" and which invoke relaxed standards. of
materiality and relevance. Id. at 742.
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The dissent also rejected the majority's assertion that the journalist's privilege is
subordinate to the government's interest in prosecuting crime.77 The majority based its
reasoning on the assumption that only when a source is actually implicated in a crime
does the reporter or source need to be worried about subpoenas.78 In reality, because of
the broad power of grandjuries,79 reporters could be subpoenaed to testify on matters
that are not related to criminal conduct.8 0 The denial of a journalist's privilege in the
grand jury context would thus create circumstances ripe for compelling and enabling
the government to "annex the press as an investigative arm,"8' clearly undermining
both freedom of the press and the foundations of democracy.
II. POST-BRANZBURG JURISPRUDENCE: INTIAL EXPANSION OF THE
PRIVILEGE FOLLOWED BY A NARROWING TREND
A. Interpretation and Application of Branzburg at the Federal Level
According to Ben Bradlee, Vice President of the Washington Post, "[t]here is a
privilege whether the Supreme Court says so or not.",8 2 This sentiment, not uncommon
among the press, is representative of the confusion that arose after the Branzburg
decision. On the one hand, the majority clearly ruled against a journalist's privilege.
Yet, journalists involved in litigation continued to argue for its existence, and many
federal courts agreed, reading the majority opinion and the concurrence together to
find a privilege. In fact, the federal courts have, by and large, recognized a qualified
constitutional privilege, supported by Justice Powell's concurrence. 3
77. See id at 744.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 744 & n.34 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
80. Id. at 744.
81. See id. at 744 n.34. Justice Stewart's prescience with regards to the Judith Miller and
Matthew Cooper cases is notable, as he expressed concern over the ability of "vindictive
prosecutors" to use the guise of investigating crime to "explore the newsman's sources at will,
with no serious law enforcement purpose." Id. Such questions have been raised about the
motives behind Special Prosecutor Fitzgerald's subpoenaing of Miller, particularly since Miller
never published the identity of Valerie Plame. See supra note 13. Fitzgerald has said of his
investigation that "he'd not wanted any 'First Amendment showdown' ... and wished Judith
Miller, who'd languished for 85 days in jail, hadn't spent a second there. Such things should
happen only very rarely . . . only when reporters [are] eyewitnesses to a crime." David
Margolick, Mr. Fitz Goes to Washington, VANITY FAIR, Feb. 2006, at 179. Nonetheless,
Fitzgerald arguably abused his prosecutorial discretion by continuing to hound journalists for
disclosure of their confidential sources, despite his knowledge of the leaker's identity. Johnston,
supra note 13.
82. Florence George Graves, Protecting the Privilege, AM. JOURNALISM R., Apr. 1998, at
22.
83. Kara Larsen, Note, The Demise of the First Amendment-Based Reporter's Privilege:
Why This Current Trend Should Not Surprise the Media, 37 CONN. L. REV. 1235, 1244 (2005).
The Sixth Circuit, however, has not explicitly recognized the journalist's privilege, see In re
Grand Jury Proceedings (Storer Grand Jury), 810 F.2d 580, 583-86 (6th Cir. 1987) (holding
that there was no First Amendment privilege for a television reporter to withhold information
sought by a grand jury), nor has the Eighth Circuit, see In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces
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There are a number of ways in which Branzburg has been interpreted. It has been
referred to as a plurality opinion; as a narrow opinion that applies only to grand juries
and criminal investigations, thus leaving room for differing interpretations in other
contexts; as wholly rejecting the journalist's privilege; and as supporting a qualified
privilege, to be determined on a case-by-case basis, pursuant to Justice Powell's
concurrence.
84
As the situation currently stands, lower federal courts essentially see Branzburg as
an endorsement of the journalist's privilege in situations other than grand jury
subpoenas for direct testimony about criminal activity.85 Yet even among federal courts
that recognize the journalist's privilege, "not all courts recognizing the privilege
follow[] precisely the same line of interpretation, describe[] the privilege in exactly the
same terms, or agree[] on its scope. 86 Specifically, courts vary on factors ranging from
the status of the information (confidential versus nonconfidential) to the type of
proceeding at issue (civil versus criminal), as well as on methodologies for balancing
the interests at stake. 87 As a result, a journalist who is considering whether to grant a
source confidentiality is "faced not only with the question of whether she may keep
information out of court, but also the issue of being subject[ed] to different rules
depending on where litigation seeking [the] information.., happens to take place."88
The Yale Law Journal foresaw, in 1970, the major jurisprudential problem that was to
arise in the years following the Branzburg decision:
Under the case-by-case method of developing rules, it will be difficult for potential
informants and reporters to predict whether testimony will be compelled since the
decision will turn on the judge's ad hoc assessment in different fact settings of
"importance" or "relevance" in relation to the free press interest. A "general"
deterrent effect is likely to result... [i]eaving substantial discretion with judges to
delineate those "situations" in which rules of "relevance" or "importance" apply
Tecum, 112 F.3d 910, 918 n.8 (8th Cir. 1997) ("[W]e believe [the] question [regarding the
existence of a qualified journalist's privilege] is an open one in this Circuit."). The Fourth and
Fifth Circuits, meanwhile, have recognized a privilege only when there is evidence of
governmental harassment or bad faith. See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 135 F.3d 963, 971 (5th
Cir. 1998); In re Shain, 978 F.2d 850, 852 (4th Cir. 1992). Finally, the Seventh Circuit recently
held that journalists should not be afforded any special privilege; rather, the courts should
simply make sure that subpoenas directed at the media are "reasonable in the circumstances,
which is the general criterion for judicial review of subpoenas." McKevitt v. Pallasch, 339 F.3d
530, 533 (7th Cir. 2003). For a discussion of recent denials of the journalist's privilege in the
First and Fifth Circuits, see supra note 17.
84. See Erik W. Laursen, Comment & Casenote, Putting Journalists on Thin Ice: McKevitt
v. Pallasch, 73 U. CIN. L. REv. 293, 301 (2004).
85. Anthony L. Fargo, Analyzing Federal Shield Law Proposals: What Congress Can
Learn From the States, 11 CoMM. L. & POL'Y 35, 39 (2006).
86. Larsen, supra note 83, at 1246; see also The Reporters Committee for Freedom of the
Press, The Free Flow of Information Act of 2006: A Brief Analysis by the Reporters Committee
for Freedom of the Press, http://www.rcfp.org/shields-and subpoenas/specter.html (last visited
Feb. 26, 2007) ("[E]ven in the circuits that recognize a reporter's privilege for protecting
confidential sources, it is always qualified by a balancing test and there is generally not a
weighing of the public interests at stake.").
87. Id. at 1247-51.
88. Laursen, supra note 84, at 310.
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would therefore seem to undermine significantly the effectiveness of a reporter-
informer privilege.
8 9
The recent Second Circuit case Gonzales v. NBC, which involved compelled
disclosure of nonconfidential information, exemplifies the problematic nature of
current lower court jurisprudence. 90 Initially, the Second Circuit found that no qualified
privilege for nonconfidential information existed under federal law, as elucidated by
the Branzburg majority opinion. On petition for rehearing, however, the court reached
a different conclusion, granting nonconfidential press materials the protection of a
qualified journalist's privilege.9 1 This decision was based on policy considerations
such as the importance ofjournalists to the dissemination of information and the public
interest in maintaining a "vigorous, aggressive, and independent press capable of
participating in robust, unfettered debate over controversial matters."92
The Gonzales case is a prime example of the problem that exists due to the lack of a
clear, national standard. As First Amendment attorney James Goodale noted, the first
Gonzales decision "made no sense at all" because journalists' nonconfidential
information was protected under New York's state shield law, but was not protected
under federal law.93 This indicates a significant notice problem, as it forces journalists
to make investigative and confidentiality decisions without knowing whether their
information could later be subject to compelled disclosure. 94
B. State Responses
Currently, thirty-one states and the District of Columbia have shield laws that
protect the press from compelled disclosure of sources, work product, and
information.95 These statutes run the gamut from broad protections that provide an
absolute privilege to laws that provide qualified privileges of various types.
96
89. Note, supra note 25, at 341.
90. 155 F.3d 618 (2d Cir. 1998), rev'd, 194 F.3d 29 (2d Cir. 1999).
91. Gonzales, 194 F.3d at 35.
92. Id. (quoting Baker v. F. & F. Inv., 470 F.2d 778, 782 (2d Cir. 1972)).
93. James C. Goodale, A Sigh of Relief, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 1, 1999, at 3.
94. The notice problem also manifested itself in the Judith Miller case. Although Miller
worked in D.C. and New York, both of which have shield laws, she was subpoenaed for a
federal grand jury investigation; thus, her ability to successfully invoke the journalist's privilege
was subject to the D.C. District Court's interpretation of the amorphous Branzburg holding.
Additionally, denying a federal journalist's privilege "frustrate[s] the purpose of state
legislation" because without a federal privilege, "any state's promise of confidentiality and
protection would have little value if the source were aware that the privilege would not be
honored in federal court." Theodore J. Boutrous & Seth M.M. Stodder, Retooling the Federal
Common-Law Reporter's Privilege, 17 SPG COMM. LAW. 1, 24 (1999).
95. CONG. RESEARCH SERv., THE LIBRARY OF CONG., JOURNALISTs' PRIVILEGE TO WITHHOLD
INFORMATION IN JUDICIAL AND OTHER PROCEEDINGS: STATE SHIELD STATUTES 1 (2005), available
at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/secrecy/RL32806.pdf. The following states do not have shield
laws: Connecticut, Hawaii, Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, Maine, Massachusetts, Missouri, Mississippi,
New Hampshire, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia,




Additionally, the application of protections forjournalists varies immensely, covering
everything from the identity of a source to notes, work product, outtakes, and even
personal observations.97 The rationale behind such shield laws is primarily protection
of the free flow of information to the public, rather than protection of individual
journalists or the press as an institution.98
C. The Present-Day Need to Strengthen the Journalist's Privilege
Although there have been some highly publicized losses byjournalists attempting to
claim a privilege against disclosure, they may not be representative of the whole story.
In fact, from October 2004, to October 2005, the press won over sixty percent of the
shield cases decided, a percentage that has been consistent over the last thirty years.
99
Why, then, should we care about the state of the journalist's privilege? While the
Branzburg decision was not favorable to journalists, it was not, on its face, a
necessarily wrong decision, as it seemed to leave open at least the possibility of a
qualified privilege. However, it has created confusion in an area of the law which
necessitates clarity. Lack of clarity regarding the government's power to compel
revelation of confidential sources undermines the functioning of the press, its ability to
keep the public informed, and ultimately democracy. Further, anecdotal evidence
indicates that the lack of consistent protection for journalists against confidential
source identity is drying up the supply of sources available to journalists, thus chilling
the dissemination of information to the public. 00 And, as the dissent in Branzburg
predicted,10 1 this state of affairs may be affecting the content choices ofjournalists.10 2
Although providing a qualified privilege to journalists would still require courts to
be involved in case-by-case determinations of whether the privilege applied (a concern
97. Id.
98. See Berger, supra note 47 at 1392. It is worth noting that one cost of shield laws is a
decrease in the amount of information available to the public when the shield is used. Id. at
1377.
99. James C. Goodale, Are all Reporters Going to Jail?, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 7, 2005, at 3.
100. See, e.g., Reporter's Shield Legislation: Issues and Implications: Hearing Before the S.
Judiciary Comm., 109th Cong. 3 (2005) (testimony of Norman Pearlstine, Editor-In-Chief,
Time, Inc.), available at http://judiciary.senate.gov/testimony.cfn?id=1579&witid=4505
[hereinafter Hearing]. "[V]aluable sources [have] insisted that they no longer trusted the
magazine and that they would no longer cooperate on stories. The chilling effect is obvious." Id.
101. The dissent worried that failing to provide protection against compelled disclosure of
confidential sources would require journalists to "speculate about whether contact with a
controversial source or publication of confidential material will lead to a subpoena." Branzburg
v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 731 (1972) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
102. For example, in 2005, the Cleveland Plain Dealer announced that it was withholding
from publication two stories "of profound importance," because both were based on leaked
documents and publication would put the paper at risk of an investigation. Doug Clifton, Jailing
Reporters, Silencing the Whistleblowers, CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER, June 30, 2005, at B9. The
paper's editor, Doug Clifton, wrote: "The public would be well served to know [the stories] ....
Publishing the stories would almost certainly lead to a leak investigation and the ultimate
choice: talk or go to jail. Because talking isn't an option and jail is too high a price to pay, these
two stories will go untold for now." Id. See also Robert D. McFadden, Newspaper Withholding
Two Articles After Jailing, N.Y. TIMES, July 9, 2005, at A 10.
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of the Branzburg majority), 10 3 this scenario would nevertheless benefit all parties
involved: journalists (both as individuals and the press as an institution), sources, and
the public. Journalists, in particular, would benefit from knowing that a qualified
privilege exists and that certain criteria must be met in order for the government to
compel disclosure of source identities. A clearer standard would, in essence, grant
journalists the tools necessary to think more carefully about confidentiality before
promising it to sources. Ifjournalists have the security of knowing a qualified privilege
exists and feel confident that they meet the requirements of that privilege, then granting
confidentiality in order to secure important information would make sense. On the
other hand, journalists could opt not to grant confidentiality if, after weighing the
factors involved, it was determined that doing so would be either unnecessary or ill-
advised in light of the applicable legal standard.
Finally, the important First Amendment values at stake, both for the press and for
society, require revisiting the journalist's privilege. As journalist Bill Kovach
eloquently stated:
[I]t is difficult to separate the concept of news and journalism from the notion of
creating community and democracy. The world in which the well of accurate,
reliable, factual information is not being constantly replenished is one that
becomes more polluted with gossip, rumor, speculation and propaganda. This is a
mixture that is toxic to civic health. This is a mixture that will produce a public
less and less able to participate in civic life. This is a mixture that makes it more
and more likely that a self-appointed elite will be free to exercise its will on
society.... Freedom and democracy depend upon individuals who refuse to give
up the belief that the free flow of information has made freedom and human
dignity possible.'°4
III. RESOLVING THE CONFUSION: POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS FOR THE
CURRENT UNWORKABLE STATE OF AFFAIRS
A. Applying Jaffee to Find a Common Law Evidentiary Privilege
By finding a common law evidentiary privilege, the Supreme Court can grant
journalists protection against disclosure of confidential sources. The Court's analysis in
establishing a common law psychotherapist-patient privilege in Jaffee v. Redmond'0 5
provides a foundation for arguing that a privilege should also be created for
journalists. 1° 6 In Jaffee, the Court expanded the evidentiary privilege provided for in
103. SeeBranzburg, 408 U.S. at 704.
104. Bill Kovach, Chairman, Committee of Concerned Journalists, Address at the
Organization of News Ombudsman (April 30, 2002), available at
http://www.publicintegrity.org/report.aspx?aid=182. Bill Kovach is a veteran newsman, former
curator of the Nieman Foundation at Harvard University, and founding chairman of the
Committee of Concerned Journalists. Id.
105. 518 U.S. 1 (1996) (7-2 decision).
106. See, e.g., Boutrous & Stodder, supra note 94; Jeffrey S. Nestler, The Underprivileged
Profession: The Case for Supreme Court Recognition of the Journalist's Privilege, 154 U. PA.
L. REV. 201 (2005); The Committee on Communications & Media Law, The Federal Common
Law ofJournalists'Privilege: A Position Paper, THE RECORD OF THE ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR
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Federal Rule of Evidence 501 107 to include a psychotherapist-patient privilege of
confidentiality. 0 8 At issue in Jaffee was whether statements made to a licensed clinical
social worker should be protected from compelled disclosure in a federal civil
action.' 9
In expanding the federal evidentiary privilege, the Court began with Rule 501,
which grants federal courts the power to "define new privileges by interpreting
'common law principles ... in the light of reason and experience. ' ' ' '0 While the
concept that the public has "a right to every man's evidence" is long-standing, it does
give way to certain exceptions. The Supreme Court has held that the rationale for an
exception to general evidentiary rules disfavoring privileges may be made when there
exists "a public good transcending the normally predominant principle of utilizing all
rational means for ascertaining truth."' 1 Thus, in Jaffee, the Court faced the challenge
of balancing the public good resulting from a psychotherapist privilege against the
need for all relevant evidence.
The Court first considered the specific relationship at issue, and the public good
served by it. In the case of psychotherapists and patients, the privilege is "rooted in the
imperative need for confidence and trust. 11 2 The relationship is characterized as one of
a sensitive nature; because of this, allowing disclosure of the information conveyed in
psychotherapist-patient sessions would undermine the relationship as well as the
underlying purpose of confidentiality (that is, successful patient treatment)." 3 Further,
ensuring that this relationship functions effectively is in the public interest, as it
facilitates mental health, which is a "public good of transcendent importance" to our
citizenry.' 14
The Court also looked at the privilege counterfactually to consider what would
result from denial of the privilege in favor of full evidentiary disclosure. The primary
concern was the chilling effect that would arise if patients were unsure whether their
confidential statements could be disclosed in court. The chill factor is even further
exacerbated when "it is obvious that the circumstances that give rise to the need for
OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, VOL. 60, No. 1 (2005).
107. Rule 501 provides that:
[Tihe privilege of a witness, person, government, state, or political subdivision
thereof shall be governed by the principles of the common law as they may be
interpreted by the courts of the United States in the light of reason and experience.
However, in civil actions and proceedings, with respect to an element of a claim or
defense as to which state law supplies the rule of decision, the privilege of a
witness, person, government, state, or political subdivison thereof shall be
determined in accordance with state law.
FED. R. EVID. 501. It should be noted that with respect to state law claims, privileges are
determined in accordance with state law. Id.
108. Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 1.
109. Id. at 3-4. The social worker in Jaffee provided therapy to a police officer who shot a
man while she was on duty. The police officer participated in approximately fifty counseling
sessions with the social worker. Id. at 4.
110. Id. at 8 (quoting FED. R. EVID. 501).
111. Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40,50 (1980) (quoting Elkins v. United States, 364
U.S. 206 (1960) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)).
112. Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 10 (citation omitted).
113. Id.
114. Id. at 11.
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treatment will probably result in litigation."' 1 5 The Court pointed out that self-
censorship would likely result from the lack of a privilege. That is, a patient would be
unlikely to disclose any information that might be useful in litigation; thus, from an
evidentiary standpoint, the outcome would be the same as if the information had been
discussed but considered privileged.' 
16
Finally, because "the policy decisions of the States bear on the question [of]
whether federal courts should recognize a new privilege or amend the coverage of an
existing one,"'"17 it was notable to the Court that all fifty states and the District of
Columbia had already enacted a form of the psychotherapist privilege.
In applying the Jaffee reasoning to the journalist's privilege, we begin with the same
question: does the public good transcend all rational means for ascertaining the truth?
If the answer is yes, then the privilege should be granted. In the case ofjournalists, the
confidential source relationship is of vital importance. Just as a patient in a
psychotherapist's office may not reveal certain information if he or she knows it is not
maintained in full confidentiality, so too might a journalist's source not supply
information if the source's identity would not be protected in court. Additionally,
sources of the type of information that is most likely to be of public importance-for
example, whistleblowers or those with inside information regarding crime or
government corruption-may not come forward if they believe their identities could be
disclosed.
Though the Branzburg majority worried that a privilege against compelled
disclosure would condone criminal activity, that concern is ill-founded. When potential
sources involved in illegal activity are deterred from speaking out or telling their
stories, the government and the public are unlikely to hear of the activity at all. It
follows that the public interest is better served by having more, rather than less
information about wrongdoing. And, as Paul McMasters notes, the First Amendment
rights at issue go beyond those ofjournalists to "the free speech and dissent rights of
government employees (or private sector employees),"" 8 who may need a confidential
outlet for airing institutional wrongdoing. Further, consideration for the First
Amendment rights of those who require a free press in order to "engage in informed
discourse" should be paramount. 19 These interests in free discourse, an informed
citizenry, and a healthy democracy certainly represent public goods worthy of
transcending the need for all relevant evidence.
20
The states' recognition of a psychotherapist-patient privilege in Jaffee additionally
supports an analogous recognition for journalists. Currently, forty-nine states and the
115. Id. at 11-12.
116. Id. Of course for the patient withholding information, the result would likely be less
effective mental health treatment.
117. Id. at 12-13 (citing Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40,48-50 (1980)). The States'
adoption of the privilege suggests that "'reason and experience' support recognition of the
privilege." Id.
118. Paul McMasters & Geoffrey R. Stone, Do Journalists Need a Better Shield?, LEGAL
AFFAIRS DEBATE CLUB, Dec. 6, 2004, http://www.legalaffairs.org/webexclusive/debateclub_
cooperl204.msp (last visited Feb. 26, 2007). McMasters is a columnist and the First
Amendment Ombudsman at the First Amendment Center. Id.
119. Id.
120. See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
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District of Columbia recognize some form of the journalist's privilege, either by statute
or common law.' 2' Clearly, there is a need for such protection for journalists and a
critical mass of states have made this policy judgment, either legislatively or judicially.
Yet, while many states offer protection, this alone is not enough. Given the
increasingly national and international scope of news coverage, the creation of a
federal privilege is of particular importance for journalists. A national journalist
subject to varying state laws will have a difficult time assessing with any confidence
whether relying on confidential sources is wise, or whether there is a risk of future
compelled disclosure. This is the very situation in which Judith Miller found herself:
while she worked in New York and Washington, D.C., both of which provide a
journalist's privilege by statute, she was subpoenaed by afederal grand jury and thus
lacked protection against compelled disclosure of her sources.
122
One stumbling block in applying Jaffee to Branzburg scenarios is a fundamental
difference in the type of confidential relationship at issue: "thejournalists' privilege is
distinct from other recognized privileges, in that the privilege vests only with the
journalist, not with the source of the information."'1 23 Thus, the privilege in the
journalist-source relationship is the journalist's to give away, despite the fact that the
confidential information would harm the source rather than the journalist. Other
relationships that recognize an evidentiary privilege place the privilege with the
individual who is subject to harm if the information is publicized (for example, in a
lawyer-client relationship, the client retains the privilege).124 However, when examined
more closely, this difference between the journalist's privilege and other evidentiary
privileges actually supports granting the privilege to journalists. Without it,journalists
subpoenaed by grand juries are in a no-win situation: they have to decide whether to be
held in contempt of court or reveal the source's identity, likely resulting in harm to the
source. Were confidentiality granted in the first place, no harm would be done to either
the individual with the privilege (that is, thejournalist) or to the individual granting the
information (that is, the source).
An additional argument against granting the evidentiary privilege is that the
journalist's ethical obligation to protect confidential sources of information "should not
be left completely in the hands of each individual journalist to define," as journalists
may take advantage of the privilege and irresponsibly grant confidentiality to
sources. 25 Other relationships entitled to the confidentiality privilege are ones that
121. Hearing, supra note 100 (testimony of Norman Pearlstein). Thirty-one states and the
District of Columbia have statutory protection. See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
Wyoming is the only state that has neither a statutory nor judicially created privilege. 152 CONG.
REc. S4803 (daily ed. May 18, 2006) (statement of Sen. Lugar).
122. Miller faced the same quandary as the reporter in Gonzales. See supra notes 90-94 and
accompanying text.
123. CONG. RESEARCH SERV., supra note 95, at Summary.
124. FISHER, supra note 6, at 756-57. While the "precise countours of the professional
privileges [i.e., psychotherapist-patient, clergy-penitent, and lawyer-client] vary," a common
element is that the privilege is the client's. Id. at 756. "The professional may assert the privilege,
but only on the client's behalf." Id. at 757.
125. Gerald F. Uelman, Leaks, Gags and Shields: Taking Responsibility, 37 SANTA CLARA L.
REv. 943, 959 (1997). Professor Uelman posits that the "[c]urrent 'shield laws' encourage the
leaking of information by protecting the leaker from any consequences for his breach of
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serve some publicly recognized goal, such as providing legal advice or administering
spiritual counseling. 126 In these relationships, legal protection attaches to a specific
promise of confidentiality only when confidentiality is related to the publicly
recognized goal. Conversely, if the specific promise of confidentiality is not related to
a recognized public goal, the privilege is not allowed.127 Although the journalist's
privilege is a recent jurisprudential development, it serves not just one, but a number of
publicly recognized goals-the free flow of information, the ability to maintain an
independent press,' 28 and an informed citizenry-and the privilege is not one that seeks
to exceed the public good it serves. While there may be some risk of journalists
irresponsibly granting confidentiality to sources, the overwhelming public good that is
served by protecting the journalist-source relationship surpasses such risk.
Additionally, codes of ethics in journalism make explicit the importance of granting
confidentiality responsibly, 129 and absent evidence to the contrary, it should be
assumed that this obligation is met.
Federal Rule of Evidence 501 provides that evidentiary privileges should be
adaptable to changing times. 130 The Branzburg majority argued that there was no
indication that refusing to recognize a journalist's privilege would undermine the
freedom of the press, because "from the beginning of our country the press has
operated without constitutional protection for press informants and the press has
flourished. The existing constitutional rules have not been a serious obstacle to either
the development or retention of confidential news sources by the press."' 31 However,
there is sufficient evidence to show that in recent years the operating rules have failed
to adequately protect the press; 132 as a consequence, the rules are no longer adequately
protecting our democracy. By applying the Jaffee reasoning to the journalist's
privilege, the Court could provide some protection to journalists without going so far
as finding the privilege within the scope of the First Amendment. Rather, the Court
could strike a compromise by recognizing the First Amendment interests at stake, and
applying them to find a journalist's privilege in Rule 501.
confidentiality, and place no responsibility on reporters for lack of restraint in promising
confidentiality to their sources." Id. at 945.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. As the court in Baker v. F & FInv. pointed out, "where the press remains free, so too
will a people remain free." 470 F.2d 778, 785 (2d Cir. 1972).
129. See, e.g., SOCIETY OF PROFESSIONAL JOURNALISTS, CODE OF ETIcs, http://www.spj.org/
pdf/ethicscode.pdf (last visited Feb. 26, 2007) ("Journalists should: . . . Always question
sources' motives before promising anonymity. Clarify conditions attached to any promise made
in exchange for information. Keep promises."); RADIo-TELEVISiON NEws DIRECTORS
ASSOCIATION & FOUNDATION, CODE OF ETHICS, http://www.rtnda.org/ethics/coe.shtml (last
visited Jan. 5, 2007) ("Professional electronic journalists should: Identify sources whenever
possible. Confidential sources should be used only when it is clearly in the public interest to
gather or convey important information or when a person providing information might be
harmed. Journalists should keep all commitments to protect a confidential source.").
130. "The Rule ... did not freeze the law governing the privileges of witnesses in federal
trial at a particular point in our history, but rather directed federal courts to 'continue the
evolutionary development of testimonial privileges.' Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 8-9
(1996) (quoting Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 47 (1980)).
131. Branzburgv. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 698 (1972).
132. See supra notes 12-19 and accompanying text.
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B. Congressional Action: The Possibility of a Federal Shield Law
In response to the highly publicized subpoenaing of reporters during 2004, the
109th Congress undertook a number of legislative efforts to provide federal protection
for journalists against the compelled disclosure of confidential sources. The first such
effort was made in February 2005, when Senator Richard Lugar (R-Indiana) and
Representative Mike Pence (R-Indiana) introduced the Free Flow of Information Act
of 2005 ("2005 legislation"). 3
The 2005 legislation borrowed provisions from the Department of Justice guidelines
for issuing subpoenas to the media, 134 and were functionally similar to the shield laws
already in place in a number of states. 35 The legislation's proponents sought to
establish "national standards that must be met before federal officials may issue a
subpoena to a member of the news media,"'136 and the key provision prohibited
compelled disclosure of confidential source identities.' 37 Further, the 2005 legislation
managed to avoid the definitional and notice problems ofjudicially-created privileges
133. S. Res. 340,109th Cong. (2005); H.R. Res. 581,109th Cong. (2005). Due to political
pressure, S.340 and H.R. 581 were redrafted and reintroduced on July 18, 2005. Louis J.
Capocasale, Comment, Using the Shield as a Sword: An Analysis of How the Current
Congressional Proposals for a Reporter's Shield Law Wound the Fifth Amendment, 20 ST.
JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 339, 362; S. Res. 1419, 109th Cong. (2005); H.R. Res. 3323 109th
Cong. (2005). The revised bills provided a qualified privilege for reporters, S. Res. 1419 §
2(a)(l), (2); H.R. Res. 3323 § 2(a)(1), (2), and provided an exception to the prohibition against
compelled disclosure of sources in cases where it could "reasonably be expected" that source
information or identity was necessary to "prevent imminent and actual harm to national
security." S. Res. 1419 § 2(a)(3); H.R. Res. 3323 § 2(a)(3). For the national security exception
to apply, the revised bill also required a showing that "compelled disclosure.., would prevent
such harm," and that "the harm sought to be redressed by requiring disclosure clearly
outweigh[ed] the public interest in protecting the free flow of information."
The original and revised bills were cosponsored by Senators Christopher Dodd (D-
Connecticut), Bill Nelson (D-Florida), Jim Jeffords (I-Vermont), and Frank Lautenberg (D-New
Jersey), as well as Representative Rick Boucher (D-Virginia). Despite cosponsoring the House
version, Representative Boucher has stated that he would "prefer that the courts interpret the
First Amendment so as to provide to reporters a privilege to refrain from revealing confidential
sources in court proceedings." Statement of Representative Rick Boucher (D-Virginia) on H.R.
581, Free Flow of Information Act, http://www.boucher.house.gov/index.php?option=com_
content&task--view&id=34 (last visited Feb. 26, 2007). However, because the courts have
declined to do so, Representative Boucher felt compelled to support the federal response. Id.
For a more thorough exposition on the proposed bills, as well discussion of similar proposals
by Senator Dodd (S. Res. 3020, 108th Cong. (2004); S. Res. 369, 109th Cong. (2005)), see
Fargo, supra note 85, and Capocasale, supra.
134. 28 C.F.R. § 50.10 (2005).
135. Mike Pence & Richard G. Lugar, Protecting the Press-And the Public, WASH. POST,
Apr. 15, 2006, at A25.
136. Id.
137. S. Res. 1419 § 2; H.R. Res. 3323 § 2.
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by specifying who the privilege covered and under precisely what circumstances it
would apply.
138
Neither the House nor Senate version of the Free Flow of Information Act of 2005
made it out of committee. In recognition of the need to clarify the "extraordinary
differences of opinion in the Federal courts of appeals,"'139 Senator Lugar thus
reintroduced the Free Flow of Information Act in 2006 ("2006 legislation"), with the
aim of striking a balance between the free flow of information and the administration
ofjustice: "The purpose of this Act is to guarantee the free flow of information to the
public through a free and active press .... while protecting the right of the public to
effective law enforcement and the fair administration ofjustice."' 4
The 2006 legislation expanded and improved upon the legislation introduced during
the 2005 session, most notably by providing more explicit detail regarding when and
how the general prohibition against compelled disclosure could be overcome. For
example, the 2006 legislation specifically stated that it applied only to information or
material received from a source with a promise of confidentiality attached, and that it
would provide a qualified privilege to journalists' 4 1 when disclosure was sought by
United States attorneys in criminal proceedings, 42 by criminal defendants, 43 and by
litigants in civil proceedings. 44 The legislation prohibited federal courts in each
scenario from compelling a journalist to disclose confidential source identity or any
records, documents, or other information obtained or received under a promise of
confidentiality. 145 Qualifying this general prohibition, however, were provisions
allowing federal courts to compel disclosure of confidential sources and information in
cases where a requisite showing was made by the party seeking disclosure, to be
determined by the courts under a "clear and convincing evidence" standard.146
Under the 2006 legislation, disclosure of confidential information sought by United
States attorneys in criminal proceedings and by civil litigants would have been allowed
only upon a showing that: alternative sources of the information had been exhausted;
138. See, e.g., Jennifer Elrod, Protecting Journalists from Compelled Disclosure: A
Proposal for a Federal Statute, 7 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y. 115, 149-61 (discussing the
definitional difficulties of determining to whom the journalist's privilege applies); Laura Durity,
Shielding Journalists- "Bloggers ": The Need to Protect Newsgathering Despite the Distribution
Medium, 2006 DUKE L. & TEcH. REV. 11, 34-35 (arguing that the Free Flow of Information
Act's definition ofjournalists does not "address modem informational technology" and fails for
being overly vague).
139. 152 CONG. REc. S4800 (daily ed. May 18, 2006) (statement of Sen. Lugar).
140. Free Flow of Information Act of 2006, S. 2831, 109th Cong. (2006). The 2006 Act was
cosponsored by Senators Arlen Specter (R-Pennsylvania), Christopher Dodd (D-Connecticut),
Lindsey Graham (R-South Carolina), and Charles Schumer (D-New York). 152 CONG. REC.
S4800 (2006).
141. Under section 3,joumalist is defined as "a person who, for financial gain or livelihood,
is engaged in the gathering, preparing, collecting, photographing, recording, writing, editing,
reporting, or publishing news or information as a salaried employee or an independent
contractor." S. 2831 § 3(3).
142. Id. § 4.
143. Id. § 5.
144. Id. § 6.
145. Id. §§ 4(a), 5(a), 6(a).
146. Id. §§ 4(b), 5(b), 6(b).
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the subpoena was not being used "to obtain peripheral nonessential, or speculative
information"; the subpoena was limited in scope; and reasonable and timely notice of a
demand for documents was provided.' 47 In addition, in criminal proceedings, the
United States attorney would have been required to show that there were "reasonable
grounds... to believe that a crime... occurred, and that the information sought [was]
critical to the investigation or prosecution, particularly with respect to directly
establishing guilt or innocence,"' 148 and that nondisclosure was contrary to the public
interest (balancing the interest in newsgathering and the free flow of information
against compelling disclosure). 149 In civil actions, the party seeking disclosure would
have also needed to show that "the information sought [was] critical to the successful
completion of the civil action,"' 50 and that nondisclosure was contrary to the public
interest ("taking into account ... compell[ed] disclosure and the public interest in
newsgathering and in maintaining the free flow of information to the widest possible
degree about all matters that enter the public sphere").15'
In addition to ensuring a fair balance between the free flow of information and the
fair administration of justice, the 2006 legislation included an important provision
protecting the rights of criminal defendants to a fair trial: under section 5, criminal
defendants seeking disclosure of confidential information would have been subjected
to a lower threshold showing than civil litigants and United States attorneys. A criminal
defendant would only be required to show: that alternative sources of the information
had been exhausted; that there were "reasonable grounds . . . to believe that the
information sought [was] directly relevant to the question of guilt or innocence or to a
fact ... critical to ... mitigation of a sentence"; that the subpoena was not being used
to obtain nonessential information; and that nondisclosure would be "contrary to the
public interest" (balancing the defendant's interest in a fair trial against the public's
interest in the free flow of information). 152
The 2006 legislation also provided important exceptions to the prohibition against
disclosure of confidential sources or information for: eyewitness observations by
journalists (or participation in criminal or tortious conduct);' 53 prevention of death or
substantial bodily injury; 5 4 and prevention of "significant and actual harm to the
national security."'
' 55
Despite the improvements made in the 2006 legislation, it suffered the same fate as
did earlier proposals, never making it out of committee. However, the legislation
introduced during the 109th Congress represents an important first step in the quest to
provide federal protection to journalists against compelled disclosure of confidential
sources. A bill like the Free Flow of Information Act of 2006 would create a national
147. Id. §§ 4(b)(1)-(3), (6), 6(b)(1), (4)-(6).
148. Id. § 4(b)(5).
149. Id. § 4(b)(4).
150. Id. § 6(b)(2).
151. Id. § 6(b)(3).
152. Id. § 5(b)(1)-(4). As with United States attorneys and civil litigants, courts would have
been required to make this determination for criminal defendants by a standard of "clear and
convincing evidence." Id. at § 5(b).
153. Id. § 7.
154. Id. § 8.
155. Id. § 9.
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standard upon which journalists could rely, thus aiding in the gathering and
dissemination of news to the public-an issue of particular importance in the modem
era of national news coverage.
Additionally, the text of the 2006 legislation and statements by its sponsors revealed
a clear Congressional intent: protection of free speech and a free press, and ensuring
that the American public has the "information [it has] a right to"-a necessary
component of a healthy democracy.15 6 By providing adequate notice to journalists and
clear interpretive guidance to courts, Congress has the ability to grant greater
protection for confidential sources in a manner that aligns with the key interests and
values at stake. At the same time, the 2006 legislation recognized the importance of the
fair administration ofjustice, and sought to ensure that, when necessary for a fair trial,
a defendant would have the opportunity to overcome the prohibition against compelled
disclosure. Further, the 2006 legislation made important exceptions,157 which
represented compromise and an understanding that an absolute privilege would not be
in the public's best interest. As Senator Dodd said about the bill, it "is not a perfect
bill," but rather "the work product of significant negotiation [and] compromise."
58
It remains to be seen how the 110th Congress will approach the issue of a federal
shield law. However, with all of the sponsors and cosponsors of the 2005 and 2006
bills returning to Congress, it seems likely that the issue will be reintroduced-and
hopefully in time for real legislative action to occur.
IV. CONGRESS: THE BEST ACTOR FOR STRENGTHENING THE PRIVILEGE WHILE
KEEPING IMPORTANT FREE SPEECH AND DEMOCRACY VALUES INTACT
The argument for granting an evidentiary privilege following the rationale laid out
in Jaffee v. Redmond is strong; however, it fails to adequately protect the important
interests of free speech and democracy that are at stake. The intent behind the Federal
Rules of Evidence is described in section 102: "[t]hese rules shall be construed to
secure fairness in administration, elimination of unjustifiable expense and delay, and
promotion of growth and development of the law of evidence to the end that the truth
may be ascertained and proceedings justly determined."' 59 The combination of placing
the determination of privileges in the hands of the judicial system and the presumption
disfavoring privileges that is inherent in the rules' 60 leaves a journalist's privilege
created by Rule 501 on shaky ground. In addition to not invoking democracy and free
speech values, a privilege created via Rule 501 would be subject to the changeability of
156. Pence & Lugar, supra note 135.
157. See supra notes 141-46 and accompanying text. Despite the exceptions provided for in
the 2006 legislation, the Department of Justice went on record about the bill, stating that it
"could weaken a criminal defendant's right to a fair trial as well as undermine national security.
It could also be manipulated to give terrorist organizations free rein to disseminate dangerous
information." Lisa Friedman, Unshielded, Am. JOURNALISM REV., Aug./Sept. 2006, available at
http://www.ajr.org/Article.asp?id=4165.
158. Chris Dodd, Senator Dodd Speaks about the Free Flow of Information Act, May 18,
2006, http://dodd.senate.gov/index.php?q=node/3486/print.
159. FED. R. EVID. 102.
160. See United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 331 (1950) (quoting 7 J. WIGMORE,
EVIDENCE § 2192, at 64 (McNaughton rev. 196 1)).
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the common law' 6 1 and would also face potential clarity and notice problems for both
journalists and sources. 162
Congressional action, however, would assure that the values of democracy and free
speech are protected, while at the same time providing the requisite clarity for courts,
journalists, and sources. Further, congressional action would institutionalize a balance
between protecting the confidentiality of sources and enabling the administration of
justice. While an absolute privilege may be too extreme, particularly in cases involving
grand juries, requiring the government to make a substantial showing in order for the
journalist's privilege to be overcome would ensure that the interests of both journalists
and the government are protected. The key to congressional action, however, is that
any proposed bill must be carefully tailored to provide clear definitions and a workable
balance between compelled disclosure in rare circumstances and a more general
protection for journalists. Professor Anthony Fargo also recommends that any bill
before Congress includes very clear legislative intent to "clarify why it is acting in
contradiction to the well-established maxim that 'the public ... has a right to every
[person's] evidence."" 163
CONCLUSION
"From Watergate to the latest corporate whistleblowers, the benefits that flow to the
public from [the] pact of confidentiality are invaluable."' 64 This statement sums up the
need for the journalist's privilege: journalists must have the freedom to obtain
information necessary for keeping the public informed about the state of our society,
and in order to do so, they must be able to operate without fear of being subjected to
compelled disclosure of the confidential sources or information they rely on. Further,
by continuing to allow courts to compel the disclosure of confidential information,
Justice Stewart's warning of government efforts to annex the press as an investigative
arm could become a reality. 65 This warning is particularly important given the type of
information that confidential sources are likely to be protecting. 66
The journalist's privilege is often framed as one that implicates the First
Amendment's promise of the freedom of the press versus the Fifth Amendment's grand
jury provision. Determining whether the First or the Fifth Amendment interest ought to
predominate requires a value judgment. However, there is one greater, overarching
interest that is often overlooked: the right of the public to receive vital information
about public affairs.'
67
161. See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
162. Leaving the application of a privilege-particularly a qualified one--to ad hoc
determinations made by the courts would mean that journalists and sources would not know, at
the time the confidential relationship was entered into, whether a court would uphold the
confidentiality. See, e.g., supra notes 46-50 and accompanying text.
163. Fargo, supra note 85, at 69 (alteration in original).
164. Geneva Overholser, The Journalist and the Whistle-Blower, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 6,2004,
at A27.
165. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 710 (1972) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
166. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
167. Alexander Meiklejohn argues that the First Amendment guards not only the freedom to
hear and to read, but also the "writing or speaking of everyone whom a citizen, at his own
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This Note synthesizes the three ways in which the law could grant protection to
journalists from compelled disclosure of confidential sources. While there has been
prior discussion of the ways in which this could be done-whether rooting protection
in First Amendment rights ofthe press, finding protection via Federal Rule of Evidence
501, or by Congressional action-this Note argues that by looking to the intent behind
each action, we can better analyze the options and thus reach a more satisfactory
conclusion.
It appears unlikely that the Supreme Court will revisit Branzburg, as it denied
certiorari in the Miller and Cooper cases.168 Additionally, while extending Federal Rule
of Evidence 501 to cover journalists has strong support based on the reasoning in
Jaffee, it fails to adequately protect free speech values and the healthy functioning of
our democracy. Congress, however, can promote these interests by providing clear
legislative intent and carefully tailored provisions. Although the Miller and Cooper
cases began a national discourse on the issue of the journalist's privilege, it is up to
Congress to act and the bill proposed by Senator Lugar and Representative Pence is a
good start. Congress needs to seriously consider the importance of press freedom to
our democracy and follow the counsel of Justice White, who stated that "Congress has
the freedom to determine whether a statutory newsman's privilege is necessary and
desirable and to fashion standards and rules as narrow or broad as deemed necessary to
deal with the evil discerned."'
169
discretion, may choose to hear or read." ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM: THE
CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS OF THE PEOPLE 118-19 (1960). Similarly, the Supreme Court has
expressed the belief that "the process of informing the public [is] the core purpose of the
constitutional guarantee of free speech and a free press." Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 726 n.1
(Stewart, J., dissenting). According to Meiklejohn, the process of informing the public of the
First Amendment is of vital importance to the health of our democracy. For voters to express
themselves at the polls, they must first "make up their minds" through "read[ing] the printed
records of the thinking and believing which other men have done in relation to those issues [that
affect the general welfare]." MEtKLEjOHN at 117. Newspapers and the media are a fundamental
source of information on such issues.
168. In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 397 F.3d 964, cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 2977 (2005).
169. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 706.
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